


# Nuclear Negotiations: Back to the Future

Joya Chatterjee

# Why Nuclear Weapons

- **Security position:** 1%-4% of national GDF are spent on this, Allies, Regional power, World Power
- **Economic positions:** ability to give sanctions/have sanctions
- **Social position:** NPT membership, UN leaders, country relations US relations with North Korea vs US relations with Israel/UK/France
- **Symbolic position :** prestige. No concidence that the UN general assembly five permanent members: China, France, Russian Federation, UK, and the US have nuclear arsenals
- **Domestic incentive:** Domestic unrest, democracy, some folks keep it alive through bureaucracy
- **Domestic Capability:** Economic level, economic capability, Level of development, effort, competence
- **Supply Network:** Technology diffusion, recreation of old technology, assistance



# Is The Issue Nuclear Strategy Or Arms Control?


## 2 mysteries

- Nuclear non use
- The missing arms race


## Its much bigger than arms control

- After the Cold War, arms control and disarmament emerged out of the Liberal Project
  - The Liberal Project and Human Rights: The Theory and Practice of a New World Order
- **Now we face :**
- Rejection of science
- Rise of populism
- Decline of the Liberal Project
- Fueled by social media
  - Pros and cons
  - people are apathetic about arms control or arms disarmament now

### Breakdown of the global arms export market



Sales of weapons around the world continue to rise in 2017 with US exports sharply up  
 Figures are for 2012 to 2016 Source: SIPRI



Changes in volume of major arms exports since 2008-12 by the 10 largest exporters in 2013-17

# Saudi Arabia Is The World's Biggest Arms Importer

Top defence importers worldwide in 2014



@StatistaCharts Source: IHS Jane's

statista



Created 1963-67  
Installed 1967  
Henry Moore  
(British)

www.henrymoore.com

Nuclear Energy at the ... Gallery |

On December 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1942, a **team of scientists** led by Italian émigré Enrico Fermi set the world's first man-made, self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction in motion at Chicago Pile 1, the world's **first artificial nuclear reactor** built at the University of Chicago's Stagg Field. The event was a **decisive step** toward the creation of the **age of atomic energy**, and critically, at the time, to the production of the **atomic bomb** for use in **World War II**.





Matthew Kroenig

Matthew Kroenig




## U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, 1962-2017

Since the late-1960s, the United States and Russia have signed a series of nuclear arms treaties that have contributed to steep cuts in their active and inactive nuclear warhead stockpiles.




Sources: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, Arms Control Association. Updated: January 19, 2017.

# The Global Race for Advanced Nuclear



## Reactor Design Types

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| ● Molten Salt Reactor                           | ● Nuclear Battery Reactor                |
| ● Fluoride Salt-cooled High Temperature Reactor | ● Small Modular Reactor                  |
| ● Liquid Metal-cooled Fast Reactor              | ● Fusion Reactor                         |
| ● High Temperature Gas Reactor                  | ● Super-Critical CO <sub>2</sub> Reactor |
| ● Pebble Bed Reactor                            | ● Super-Critical Water-Cooled Reactor    |



**Getting Back in the Game: A Strategy to Boost American Nuclear Exports**




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## 2018 ESTIMATED GLOBAL NUCLEAR WARHEAD INVENTORIES

The world's nuclear-armed states possess a combined total of roughly 15,000 nuclear warheads; more than 90 percent belong to Russia and the United States. Approximately 9,600 warheads are in military service, with the rest awaiting dismantlement.




Sources: Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, U.S. Department of State, and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.  
Updated: June 20, 2018.

Arms Control  
Association

# 2018 Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories

The world's nuclear-armed states possess a combined total of roughly 15,000 nuclear warheads; more than 90 percent belong to Russia and the United States. Approximately 9,600 warheads are in military service, with the rest awaiting dismantlement.



- Retired:** warheads no longer in the stockpile but remain intact as they await dismantlement
- Stockpiled:** warheads assigned for potential use on military delivery vehicles; includes active and inactive warheads.
- Strategic Deployed:** warheads on ballistic missiles and at U.S. bomber bases. *Numbers based on New START counting rule which counts operationally deployed ballistic missile warheads and heavy bombers.*

Sources: Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris; U.S. Department of State; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Updated June 20, 2018.

ArmsControl  
Association

prospective entrants to the global arms control regime:

BROOKINGS' CANDIDATES FOR MULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL

 RUSSIA UNITED STATES	 FRANCE CHINA UK	 PAKISTAN INDIA	 ISRAEL N. KOREA
---	--	--	--


Limited By  
Treaties

Logical Next  
Entrants


Burgeoning  
Arsenals

Known  
Unknowns

# Who has helped?




Kroenig, Matthew. 2009. "Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance." *American Journal of International Law* 103 (3): 112-133. doi:10.1017/S00030554090090017





# Who has helped?



Kroenig, Matthew. 2009. "Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance." *American Journal of International Law* 103 (3): 413-433. doi:10.1017/S0003055X09000017





Figure 1.1: Nuclear weapons projects' timelines to success or abandonment

(Black bars: success; White bars: abandonment; Striped bar: outcome uncertain)



Sometimes help did not work

Jacques E.C. Hymans, *Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

# Safeguards to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation

*(Updated September 2018)*

- **Most countries participate in international initiatives designed to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons.**
- **The international safeguards system has since 1970 successfully prevented the diversion of fissile materials into weapons.**
- **Its scope has been widened to address undeclared nuclear activities.**
- **The IAEA undertakes regular inspections of civil nuclear facilities and audits the movement of nuclear materials through them.**
- **Safeguards are backed by diplomatic and economic measures**
- **Over almost 50 years the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system under the [Nuclear](#)**




# Safeguards problems 1980s-90s

<http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library>


- [Iraq, Iran and North Korea](#) illustrate both the strengths and weaknesses of international safeguards.
- Iraq and Iran had set up elaborate equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich uranium, in Iraq's case, to weapons grade
- North Korea used research reactors (not commercial electricity-generating reactors) and a reprocessing plant to produce some weapons-grade plutonium.
- The weakness of the NPT regime lay in the fact that no obvious diversion of material was involved. The uranium used as fuel probably came from indigenous sources, and the key nuclear facilities concerned were built by the countries themselves without being declared to the IAEA or placed safeguards arrangements.
- Iraq, as an NPT party, had to declare all facilities but did not. Nor, more recently, did Iran
- In North Korea, the activities concerned took place before the conclusion of its NPT safeguards agreement, using a Russian "research" reactor and clandestine reprocessing plant.

**Just when we  
thought we took  
care of all the  
weapons of mass  
destruction  
(Iran/Iraq)  
Who rears his head  
.....**

**Kim Jong-un**




Kim Jong-un watching the rocket take off looks like a Pink Floyd ...



## North Korea Has Conducted Its Sixth Nuclear Test

Nuclear bomb tests worldwide since 1945



@StatistaCharts Source: SIPRI

statista

# The Art of Presidential Negotiation



No agreement



Rejects formality, treaties, and MOU's



Concentrates on personal power and discretion



Eliminates role of state department, congress, and experts




Benefits personally

Creates a crisis by building up tension, then brings it back to what was before and takes credit for solving a non issue



Art of the N.Korea  
no deal



Tom

Cagle.com

Are we  
expectin  
g and  
Eureka  
moment



- Are we waiting for a disarmament?
- Are we waiting for a new idea?
- Or do we know the solution already?





Nuclear policy isn't about nuclear policy anymore



You cant go there from here



Develop a bigger picture : don't study arms control to understand arms control



More than ever before to manage a nuclear world we must become more sensitive to the world around us



Above all...how to make policy in an era of global populism



***“The President wants to know if North Korea’s missiles can reach Michael Cohen.”***

# Some Thoughts



# References

[https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Matthew%20Kroenig\\_Exporting%20the%20Bomb.pdf](https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Matthew%20Kroenig_Exporting%20the%20Bomb.pdf)

<https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers> (STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE )

<https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/nuclear-disarmament-arms-control-and-non-proliferation>

<https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-civilian-firms-fact-check-north-koreas-denuclearization-efforts>

<https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/after-all-the-swagger-trumps-talks-with-north-korea-collapse>

<https://www.visualcapitalist.com/worlds-nuclear-weapons/>

<https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=KzkPv1Zr0Nc>

<https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=b6Td8vlzE9g>

[illegible]

- What are the political factors driving nuclear production and negotiations today? Why are nuclear weapons still produced if there are agreements and treaties in place.
- How have nuclear agreements impacted negotiations in the past? How will Trump's withdrawal from agreements e.g JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran deal) impact the US and its allies.
- N.Korea is arguably the nation with the most unpredictable nuclear arsenal and capabilities...what role can the US play in disarming this threat? How can strategies for disarming be useful in this current situation?
- Developed in 1940..nuclear weaponry is a relatively recent issue in foreign policy...how has history influenced and how have nuclear negotiations evolved since the emergence in the 40's?
- Last summer Donald Trump announced the Space Force to protect American interest in outer space...how will this impact nuclear negotiations? Would it increase security


Back up slides

# Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

<http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library>


- The NSG, formerly known as the London Group or London Suppliers Group, was set up in 1974 after India exploded its first nuclear device. The main reason for the group's formation was to bring in France, a major nuclear supplier nation which was not then party to the NPT.
- The NSG Guidelines were to ensure that transfers of nuclear material or equipment would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities,
- The Guidelines also recognised the need for physical protection measures in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable materials, and strengthened re-transfer provisions.
- The NSG began with seven members – the USA, the

# Who has helped?



Kroenig, Matthew. 2009. "Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance." *American Political Science Review* 103 (01): 113-133. doi:10.1017/S0003055409090017.

# Who has helped?



Kroenig, Matthew. 2009. "Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance." *American Journal of International Law* 103 (4): 112-132. doi:10.1017/S0003055409000017